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Abstract1
Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw2
the right distinctions between speech acts (like promises, assertions, and oaths) that3
can be lies and speech acts (like commands, suggestions, or assumptions) that under4
no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to5
draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion 16
of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric7
commitment is analysed in terms of two normative components: ‘accountability’ and8
‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired dis-9
tinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying.10
Keywords Definition of lying · Speech act theory · Assertion · Commitment ·11
Performative utterances · Deception · Insincerity12
1 Introduction13
Dishonest communication plays an important role in the spread of misinformation,14
often with dramatic consequences: recent, blatant examples are the false promises that15
supported the Brexit campaign (see e.g. Chappell 2016; Watson 2018), and the false-16
hoods (spread by Twitterbots and fake news websites) that plagued the US presidential17
elections in 2016 (Silverman 2016; Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Given the social and18
moral significance of lying, it is not surprising that disciplines as diverse as sociology,19
linguistics, and psychology have displayed an increasing interest in its analysis. A20
fundamental philosophical question that cuts across these disciplines concerns how to21
define lying.22
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Several authors have attempted to offer an analysis of the concept of lying in23
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. A variety of different proposals have24
emerged in the literature, sparking a lively debate about which definition best captures25
our intuitions (for an overview, see Mahon 2015). This paper presents a puzzle for26
existing accounts of lying, showing that they are all unable to track our intuitions about27
whether a given utterance is a lie, and puts forward a definition of lying that is able to28
solve it.29
With some approximation, extant definitions of lying can be grouped into three30
families: deceptionist definitions (according to which all lies are intended to deceive)31
assertion-based definitions (according to which all lies are assertions), and hybrid32
accounts (which incorporate both requirements). Let us briefly familiarise ourselves33
with each view.34
According to deceptionist definitions (Isenberg 1964; Primoratz 1984; Mahon 2008;35
Lackey 2013), lying consists in saying (as opposed to implying) what you believe to36
be false, with the intention of deceiving your audience into believing what you said.37
More formally:38
Deceptionist definitions:39
S lies to A iff:40
(a) S utters a declarative sentence with content p141
(b) S believes that ¬p42
(c) S intends A to believe that p43
The distinctive feature of deceptionist definitions is the ‘intention to deceive’44
requirement (c) (which can be phrased in slightly different ways, see Mahon 2008;45
Fallis 2018). Beyond the mere intuition that lying is a form of intentional deception, a46
key theoretical motivation for including this requirement is its ability to differentiate47
between genuine lies and other believed-false declarative utterances that are not lies,48
such as ironic, metaphorical, and fictional utterances, which are not meant to deceive49
the audience about their literal content.50
In recent years an impressive case has been mounted against deceptionist accounts51
(Carson et al. 1982, p. 17; Carson 2006; Sorensen 2007, 2010; Arico and Fallis 2013;52
Fallis 2015, 2018; Krstić 2018, 2019; Marques 2020), prompting several authors to53
abandon condition (c). Scholars who reject (c) acknowledge that a definition featuring54
only (a) and (b) would be too broad, as it would include ironic, metaphorical, and55
fictional utterances. Typically, their solution is to replace (c) with a condition requiring56
that the speaker genuinely asserts that p. More formally:57
Assertion-based definitions:58
S lies to A iff:59
1 Condition (a) can be formulated in slightly different ways: some authors phrase it as “S says that p” (e.g.
Saul 2012; Stokke 2013a), others as “S states that p” (e.g. Chisholm and Feehan 1977; Mahon 2015). I
chose this formulation because it is neutral about the semantics of performative utterances, a topic discussed
at length in the next section. Different formulations aside, condition (a) tracks the requirement that a
locutionary act with content p must be performed, as opposed to the requirement (set by condition (d), cf.
p. 3) that a specific illocutionary act (i.e. assertion) is performed. My phrasing of (a) is not meant to rule
out subsentences (“For you!” indicating a letter) and elliptical signs (nodding in response to a question); I
am leaving aside these complications merely for ease of exposition, as it is customary in the literature.
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(a) S utters a declarative sentence with content p60
(b) S believes that ¬p61
(c) In making the utterance, S is asserting that p62
Scholars who endorse assertion-based definitions of lying2 tend to agree that a63
speaker lies iff she asserts something insincerely, but disagree on what to count as an64
assertion for the purpose of defining lying.3 In other words, assertion-based definitions65
of lying differ depending on how the ‘assertion-condition’ (d) is formulated. Hybrid66
accounts (the third family of definitions) incorporate both condition (c) and condition67
(d) in their definition of lying.468
The next section (Sect. 2) introduces a new puzzle for definitions of lying: dis-69
tinguishing between the speech acts that can be lies and those that cannot. It shows70
that deceptionist definitions are unable to make the right distinctions in this respect.71
The subsequent sections will review the most prominent assertion-based definitions72
(Stokke 2013a, b, 2018; Fallis 2012, 2013; Carson 2006), showing that these proposals73
are either similarly unable to draw the required distinctions (Sect. 3.1–3) or vulnerable74
to further counterexamples (Sect. 3.4). Where these accounts have failed, I argue that75
a definition based on the notion of assertoric commitment can succeed. After intro-76
ducing a novel account of assertoric commitment (Sect. 4), I show that the resulting77
definition of lying avoids the difficulties affecting other accounts, and provides an78
adequate analysis of the concept of lying (Sect. 5).79
2 The puzzle of explicit performatives80
One of the main contentions of this paper is that a good definition of lying should be81
able to draw a distinction between the speech acts that are ‘lie-apt’ and those that are82
not. I will argue that some explicit performative sentences can be used to lie (Sect. 2.1),83
while others can be used to deceive, but not to lie (Sect. 2.2).5 The importance of this84
2 This label was first introduced by Stokke (2013a). Proponents of this view include Carson (2006, 2010);
Sorensen (2007, 2010); Fallis (2009, 2012, 2013); Stokke (2013a, 2018).
3 Carson (2006, 2010) and Saul (2012) suggest that a further condition might be required, namely that
the asserted proposition be actually false—but neither commits to this further requirement (for compelling
empirical reasons not to include this condition, see Wiegmann et al. 2016). Also, different authors take (d)
to have different significance. Some (e.g. Chisholm and Feehan 1977, p. 142; Fallis 2009, p. 33; Meibauer
2014) take their proposed phrasing of (d) to be a definition of assertion. Others do not wish to “[commit
themselves] to a view of the final analysis of the phenomenon of assertion” (Stokke 2013a, b, p. 46, cf.
Carson 2006, p. 300).
4 The label ‘hybrid’ is mine. Defenders of this view include Simpson (1992); Mannison (1969); Chisholm
and Feehan (1977); Kupfer (1982); Newey (1997); Williams (2002); Meibauer (2005, 2014); Faulkner
(2007, 2013). Many of these authors are motivated to endorse both (c) and (d) by Gricean considerations
about the nature of communicative acts and testimony (cf. fn 10).
5 In what follows, my discussion will inevitably be limited to a few examples, since it is practically impos-
sible to discuss every performative verb of the English language. The chosen linguistic sample, however, is
significant: my token utterances are representative of classes of speech acts (assertives, commissives, direc-
tives) on which we have straightforward intuitions. I will not consider other classes, such as declarations
and expressives, because I do not take our intuitions about them to be straightforward enough to establish
whether a given definition should count them as lies or not.
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becomes apparent once we realise (Sect. 2.3–3) that most existing definitions are85
inaccurate, precisely because they are unable to draw this distinction.86
2.1 Lying with explicit performatives87
Explicit performative sentences (‘explicit performatives’ for brevity) are declarative88
sentences of the form “I (hereby) [performative verb] that Φ”, in which the speaker89
performs a given illocution (promising, asserting, betting, etc.) by declaring that they90
are performing that illocution. Utterances (1) to (3) are examples of explicit perfor-91
matives that can be lies. To simplify the discussion, I have marked the content of each92
speech act (what the speaker is promising, asserting, swearing, etc.) with an asterisk:93
(1) I assert that (1*) I received expressed consent from the patient94
(2) I promise that (2*) I will wear a blue dress at the wedding95
(3) I swear that (3*) I saw the defendant at the crime scene96
Intuitively, (1), (2)6, and (3) can be lies under the right circumstances—whenever the97
speaker believes, respectively, that (1*), (2*) or (3*) is false (and aims to convince98
the interlocutor that these propositions are true). To put the same point differently: the99
fact that you are explicitly asserting, promising, or swearing that something is the case100
does not render you immune from the accusation of having lied.101
It could be argued, however, that performative utterances can never be lies. Since102
assuming the opposite (i.e. that some performatives can be lies) is crucial to the103
argument delivered in this paper, I will begin by reconstructing and dismissing the case104
against performative lies. The reader who already shares the intuition that (1–2–3) are105
genuine lies can jump to Sect. 2.2, where I proceed to expose the rest of my argument.106
Let us call the view that performative utterances can never be lies the ‘No-107
Performatives View’. This view maintains that (1–2–3) cannot be lies, despite our108
pre-theoretical, naïve intuitions about them, and is motivated by a ‘descriptivist’109
semantic theory of the content of explicit performatives. A descriptivist semantics110
is one that identifies the propositional content of our explicit performatives with the111
full sentences (1, 2, 3), rather than the embedded that-clauses (1*, 2*, 3*).7 On this112
view, if you utter (3), you assert that you are swearing that you saw the defendant at113
the crime scene. If we interpret performatives in this literal way, it becomes apparent114
that it is virtually impossible to lie by uttering them (cf. Searle 1989, p. 539; Marsili115
2016, pp. 275–277).116
To appreciate this point, recall that lying requires insincerity: you must believe117
that the content of your utterance is false (condition (b) in the definitions above). But118
whenever you proffer (3), you know that it is true that you are swearing that you119
saw the defendant at the crime scene (i.e. that (3) is true), because your saying so120
amounts to swearing it. Therefore, whenever you say (3) you know that (3) is true. If121
6 For experimental evidence that ordinary speakers overwhelmingly classify insincere promises like (2) as
lies, and a more general defence of the view that you can lie by promising, see Marsili (2016). Relatedly,
authors like Ross (1930), Fried (1978) and Carson (2006, 2010) take all lying to involve the breach of an
implicit promise to tell the truth; on this view, “every lie is a broken promise” (Fried 1978, p. 67).
7 Descriptivism is advocated by Hedenius (1963); Lewis (1970); Bach (1975); Ginet (1979); Bach and
Harnish (1979).
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descriptivism is true, and the content of (3) is just (3), it follows that whenever you122
utter (3) you are sincere. The same diagnosis applies to any other explicit performative123
utterance, including (1) and (2). On a descriptivist reading, performative utterances124
can never be lies.8125
It is far from obvious that descriptivism is an adequate account of performative126
utterances; as a matter of fact, this view is subject to a number of compelling objections127
(see e.g. Harris 1978; Searle 1989; Reimer 1995; Jary 2007). If descriptivism is an128
inadequate account of performative utterances, then there is no strong reason to accept129
the No-Performatives View, nor its counterintuitive consequence that (1–3) cannot be130
lies. But even if we leave aside the shortcomings of descriptivism, there are compelling131
reasons to reject the No-Performatives View: its predictions are hard to square with132
our most basic intuitions about lying, with our moral judgements, and with our legal133
practices.134
To illustrate, consider the following. Every existing definition of lying converges135
(and rightly so) on the prediction that, uttered alone, the starred statements (1*), (2*),136
and (3*) can be lies (as long as they are uttered insincerely). This is intuitive, but it137
exposes some counterintuitive implications of the No-Performatives View. A speaker138
who disbelieves (3*) lies if she plainly asserts that she saw the defendant at the crime139
scene with (3*); but if the same speaker chooses instead to swear that she saw the140
defendant (uttering (3) instead) she is sincere and is telling the truth according to the141
No-Performative View. While there may be a trivial, ‘technical’ sense in which these142
remarks are correct (i.e. a descriptive, overly literal interpretation of what the speaker143
is saying), these assessments clearly do not reflect our real-world communicative144
practices. Clearly, choosing (3) over (3*) in court will not render you immune from a145
charge of perjury. By swearing, you are assuming more responsibility for what you say146
than by plainly making the same claim. Rather than freeing you from the accusation147
of having lied, choosing (3) over (3*) renders you liable to stronger criticisms if it148
turns out that (3*) is false. If lying is a concept designed to track the most severe form149
of communicative dishonesty (Adler 1997; Williams 2002, p. 197; Krauss 2017), then150
it is just not clear how we can plausibly maintain that the speaker of (3*) is lying and151
the speaker of (3), who undertakes even more responsibility for the same claim, is not.152
Similar considerations apply to promises. Both by promising that you will wear a153
blue dress at the wedding (2) and by merely announcing that you will do it (2*), you154
create an expectation that you will show up at the wedding with a blue dress. The155
only difference is that when you promise you take on a stronger and more explicit156
responsibility to make it happen. Oddly, the No-Performatives View predicts that only157
when you assume less responsibility you are lying. Mutatis mutandis, the same point158
applies to the difference between simply stating that you have expressed consent from159
a patient (1*) and explicitly asserting it (1).160
8 According to descriptivism, performative utterances can at most be ‘misleading’. Descriptivists will
concede that with (3) the speaker can perform an indirect speech act with content (3*) (Bach and Harnish
1979, p. 208). On this view, (3) can be used to imply that the speaker saw the defendant at the crime
scene, but not to directly claim it – so that (3) is at most deceptive or misleading. I discuss at length the
implications of descriptivism for the lying/misleading distinction in Marsili (2016, pp.: 275–278). For more
on the distinction and its importance, see e.g. Adler (1997), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013b), Berstler (2019).
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These counterintuitive predictions extend to many other performatives that are161
barely distinguishable from direct assertions: warning, admitting, insisting, agreeing,162
denying, guaranteeing, assuring, etc. For example, the No-Performative View predicts163
that under no circumstances (1a), (1b), and (1c) can be lies. And yet, these utterances164
are not significantly (practically, legally, morally, etc.) different from the plain assertion165
(1*):166
(1a) I warn you that (1*) I received expressed consent from the patient167
(1b) I admit that (1*) I received expressed consent from the patient168
(1c) I guarantee that (1*) I received expressed consent from the patient169
Recapitulating, there are strong motivations to reject the No-Performatives View:170
it clashes with our pre-theoretical intuitions about performative utterances, and its171
predictions are difficult to reconcile with our moral judgments, our legal practices,172
and with our reactive attitudes to performative utterances in real-life situations. On the173
other hand, the positive case supporting the No-Performatives View is weak: the only174
theoretical motivation to accept it is that it is entailed by descriptivism, a view that is not175
exempt from objections. In what follows, I will therefore proceed on the assumption176
that the No-Performatives View is incorrect, and that a good definition of lying should177
accommodate the intuition that (1–2–3), (1a–1b–1c), and cognate utterances can be178
lies.179
2.2 Explicit performatives that cannot be lies180
Although some explicit performative utterances can be lies under the right conditions,181
not all performative utterances can be. Consider the following examples:182
(4) I conjecture that (4*) the blood on the blade is Reza’s183
(5) I advise that (5*) you try that quiche184
(6) I command that (6*) you steal that chicken185
In the previous section, we saw that (1–2–3) are lies whenever the speaker believes186
their respective content [(1*), (2*), (3*)] to be false. By contrast, it is not clear under187
which conditions (4), (5) or (6) could be lies. While they can surely be deceptive or188
misleading, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to lie by uttering them. For example,189
if I conjecture that the blood on the blade is Reza’s even though I know it is not [I190
disbelieve (4*)], it would be appropriate to criticise me for having been deceptive, but191
not for having lied, since I have merely conjectured that (4*) is true, and conjecturing192
something is not yet claiming that it is true. The advice (5) can be misleading in several193
ways: it may falsely imply that the quiche is delicious, or falsely suggest that the hearer194
can (and will) eat the quiche. Similarly, the command (6) may falsely imply that it is195
possible to steal the chicken (even though it is well guarded), or that the speaker has the196
authority to command its theft (even though she is merely impersonating someone with197
such authority). But even though (4), (5) and (6) can be deceptive in several different198
ways, it seems that under no circumstances could they be appropriately classified as199
lies.9200
9 In a recent paper, Viebahn (2019) has argued that one can lie by presuppositions. If this is right, insofar
as any speech act can trigger a presupposition, any speech act can be used for lying: e.g. (5) could be a lie
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It should now be clear that some speech acts can be lies, while some others cannot.201
This is important, because it has crucial implications for theorising about lying. It202
establishes two key desiderata for a definition of lying to which theorists have paid203
little attention so far: a good definition should be able to acknowledge (a) that some204
performative utterances (explicit assertions, promises, sworn statements, warnings,205
etc.) can be lies, but also (b) that some other performative utterances (like conjectures,206
advices, and orders) cannot be lies. To understand the importance of these considera-207
tions for our theorising about lying, let us consider its implications for what is perhaps208
the most influential philosophical view about lying: deceptionism.209
2.3 The puzzle applied: deceptionism210
Are deceptionist accounts able to draw all the desired distinctions? The answer can only211
be negative, since all deceptionist definitions classify (4–5–6) as lies. These sentences212
are all in the declarative mood, so that they all meet condition (a). Furthermore, we213
have just seen that it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the speaker believes that214
the content of any of these sentences is false, and intends to make the audience believe215
that it is true, so that conditions (b) and (c) can also be met. Against the desiderata,216
deceptionist definitions classify deceptive uses of (4–5–6) as lies. If this is correct,217
deceptionist definitions are not intensionally accurate.218
Appealing to a descriptivist interpretation will not help the deceptionist, for reasons219
that were given above (Sect. 2.1). Admittedly, a descriptivist reading of deceptionist220
definitions would exclude (4–5–6), because (so interpreted) these sentences are true221
in virtue of the speaker’s saying so. But a descriptivist reading would also rule out222
every other performative lie. This is not a good trade-off for deceptionism, because it223
prevents it from counting explicit assertions, warnings, sworn statements, and other lie-224
apt speech acts as lies. Whichever semantics of performative utterances we favour,10225
deceptionist definitions will be able to accommodate one of the required sets of intu-226
itions, but not both.227
We will see that the challenge faced by deceptionist accounts applies to every other228
definition of lying. A good definition should be able to classify explicit performatives229
like (1–2–3) as lies, but also exclude performatives like (4–5–6), which under no230
circumstances can be correctly classified as lies. In the next sections, I will show that231
Footnote 9 continued
if the speaker knows that there is no quiche that the hearer can try. Viebahn’s view can be disputed, but I
do not wish to enter the debate on presuppositional lying here. If one is moved by Viebahn’s arguments,
my claim should be read as follows: that (4), (5), (6) cannot be used to lie about their content (4*), (5*)
and (6*), and that a good definition of lying should predict so. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume this
conditional qualification as implicit throughout the paper.
10 Another ‘semantic’ strategy would be to argue that (4–5–6) cannot meet condition (b) because they do
not possess truth-evaluable content. However, parallel problems apply. While some linguists have in fact
challenged (in one way or another) the idea that every speech act possesses truth-evaluable content, what
is needed here is a theory that both excludes (4–5-–6) and includes (1–2–3). Proving that such a theory of
content cannot be developed goes beyond the ambitions of this paper, but there are at least two reasons
to suspect that this solution is not viable. First, despite the vast literature on explicit performatives, no
theory that draws these distinctions has been defended before (see Recanati 2013 for an overview). Second,
a plausible theory should employ either syntactic features or direction of fit to set apart performative
sentences that have truth-evaluable content from those who don’t, but neither of these features can be used
to set apart the two groups of sentences under consideration (1–2–3 and 4–5–6) (see fn 19 for an example).
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also assertion-based definitions are unable to meet these desiderata. While I will not232
discuss hybrid accounts, it should be noted that for any given assertion-based definition233
that cannot rule out (4–5–6), so is the hybrid account built on that definition (because234
the intention to deceive condition alone (c) is unable to discard these cases). In other235
words: whenever an assertion-based account is proved to be too narrow, so is the hybrid236
account that it is built on it.11237
3 Testing extant definitions238
3.1 Intentionally communicating something false239
Since assertion-based definitions differ primarily in how the assertion condition (d) is240
formulated, in what follows I will only discuss how the assertion condition is formu-241
lated by different authors, keeping (a) and (b) fixed.12 I will first discuss Fallis’ work.242
In a series of recent papers, (2009, 2012, 2013) Fallis delineates a number of ways243
to develop an assertion-based definition of lying. In Fallis (2012),13 lying is defined244
as the intentional, explicit communication of something that the speaker believe to be245
false. The following assertion-condition (d) is adopted14:246
ACF1: S intends to communicate that p247
Fallis acknowledges that the notion of ‘communication’ plays a key role in this pro-248
posal: “what counts as communication makes a difference for what counts as a lie249
[according to ACF1]”. Nonetheless, he controversially adds that no particular notion250
of communication is needed for his account to work: “for purposes of this paper, it will251
not be necessary to settle on one specific account of communication” (2012, p. 572). It252
is hard to agree with this claim. Absent a clear criterion to determine whether an utter-253
ance is ‘intended to be communicated’, ACF1 is underdetermined: it does not provide254
a clear and univocal criterion to determine whether a given utterance is a lie—in other255
words, it fails to define what lying is (cf. Keiser 2016, p. 476fn).256
It could be argued, however, that failing to specify what is meant by ‘communica-257
tion’ need not lead to this sort of indeterminacy. Fallis might not have specified what he258
11 Matters are slightly more complex for ‘Gricean’ hybrid views, according to which a speaker S asserts
that p iff S intends her audience A to accept that p at least partly on the basis of the fact that A recognises
S’s intention to make A accept that p (endorsed, slightly amended, by Meibauer 2005, 2014; Faulkner
2007, 2013). Here the deception condition (c) and the assertion condition (d) impose virtually the same
constraint. I will not discuss these views here because they have already been criticised at length elsewhere
(e.g. Fallis 2010, 2018), but it is worth noting that (beyond known counterexamples) they will have trouble
accommodating the examples discussed in Sect. 3.2 (bets, conjectures and suppositions) and in Sect. 3.4
(proviso-lies).
12 The recurring acronym “AC” will be meant to remind the reader that, for each view, I am reporting the
“Assertion Condition” (d) rather than the whole definition, which includes also (a) and (b)).
13 I will not discuss Fallis’ (2009) proposal: it has been shown to be incorrect, because it counts most
ironical utterances as lies (Stokke 2013a, b), and was rejected by Fallis himself (2012).
14 Fallis (2012) never presents conditions (a)–(b)–(d) separately, but rather packs them together in a single
sentence. Nonetheless, he is committed to ACF1 being a necessary condition for lying in addition to (a)
and (b). For ease of exposition, I will ignore this complication.
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means by ‘communication’ simply because he has in mind a rather ordinary notion.15259
Accordingly, we may assume that ACF1 is satisfied iff an ideal English speaker would260
agree that the speaker intended to communicate that p, in the ordinary sense of the261
term.262
However, as the predictions of ACF1 become clearer, its structural problems become263
clearer too. Specifically, ACF1 is unable to rule out many performative utterances that264
are not lie-apt. This is because virtually any speech act (and not only the ones that are265
lie-apt) can be accompanied by the intention to communicate that their content is true.266
To illustrate, consider (4) once again:267
(4) I conjecture that (4*) the blood on the blade is Reza’s268
Imagine a speaker (call her Luisa) who utters (4) with the intention to insinuate that the269
blood on the blade is indeed Reza’s. There is clearly a sense in which Luisa intends270
to communicate that the blood is Reza’s: if she believes that (4*) is false, Fallis’s271
definition would classify her conjecture as a lie.16 But this verdict is incorrect. If272
Luisa were to be accused of lying, it would be perfectly appropriate for her to object273
that she has merely conjectured, but never affirmed, that the blood was Reza’s. Even274
in a court of law, (4) could not plausibly be regarded as a lie, precisely because it is275
flagged as a mere conjecture (cf. S. Green 2001, pp. 176–82; Saul 2012, pp. 95–97).276
This is not to deny that, by uttering (4) maliciously, Luisa can insinuate or imply that277
the blood was Reza’s: this is exactly what happens when Luisa intends to communicate278
that (4*) is true, satisfying ACF1. The point here is rather that insinuating or implying279
something falls short of lying—it falls on the ‘misleading’ side of the lying/misleading280
distinction. This objection to ACF1 is not limited to conjectures: similar considerations281
would apply if Luisa had suggested, hypothesised, bet or guessed that (4*) is the case.282
It is also possible to imagine circumstances in which ACF1 would classify directive283
speech acts as lies. Imagine a conversation between two individuals, A and B; A has284
complete authority over B. A says “What shall I do next?”; B replies with (6):285
(6) I command that (6*) you [will] steal that chicken286
In this context, surely B’s communicative intention is to issue a command—to tell A287
what she must do. But given that A has asked what to do next, in uttering (6) B may288
conceivably intend not only to issue a command, but also to convey an answer to A’s289
question: to inform A of what she is doing next, namely (6*). If we postulate that B290
15 Although it would be a natural move, note that we cannot interpret ACF1 as appealing to Gricean
communicative intentions. Gricean communication requires (broadly) that the speaker intends to make
the audience believe what they say; pairing this requirement with the insincerity condition (b) amounts
to reintroducing an intention to deceive condition (c). Since Fallis’ project is to provide an alternative to
deceptionism, this interpretation is not available. Furthermore, since Gricean definitions have been defended
elsewhere (see fn 12), interpreted in this way ACF1 would no longer represent an original proposal. To be
sure: another, more modestly ‘Gricean’ reading (according to which ‘communicating’ means ‘expressing
a belief’) could work for ACF1; I discuss it in Sect. 2.3.
16 Remember that what is at stake here is whether the speaker would be lying about (4*), not about (4).
As we saw in (Sect. 2.1), accepting the opposite view, according to which the proposition to be evaluated
is rather (4) (descriptivism), would force us to conclude that no performative utterance can be a lie. This
is incorrect: a good definition must acknowledge that (among others) explicit assertions, sworn statements
and promises can be lies.
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believes (6*) to be false (for instance, if B knows that the envisaged poultry theft is291
impossible), ACF1 would incorrectly classify this case as a lie.292
Let me emphasise that the claim here is not that (4) or (6) conventionally or typically293
communicate contents like (4*) and (6*), but rather that there can be contexts in294
which it would not be blatantly irrational for the speaker to have the intention to295
communicate such propositions. Since both (4) and (6) can clearly meet this latter,296
weaker requirement, there are circumstances in which ACF1 incorrectly classifies297
them as lies, against our desiderata.298
3.2 Representing yourself as believing299
In a more recent paper, Fallis develops a different proposal; possibly, one that could300
be read as a refinement of ACF1. Drawing on some observations by Davidson (1985,301
2001), Fallis (2013) identifies the following assertion-condition for defining lying:302
ACF2: The speaker intends to represent herself (to her audience) as believing303
that p is true304
To ‘represent yourself as believing something’ is to present yourself as having a par-305
ticular property, namely the property of believing a proposition. Fallis correctly points306
out that we have an intuitive grasp of the notion of ‘representing yourself as having a307
certain property’, and this becomes evident when we think about familiar cases: when308
you sign a cheque, you represent yourself as having enough money in the bank to309
honour the cheque (Black 1952, p. 31); by wearing a cross necklace, you represent310
yourself as being Christian, and so forth.311
Even though ACF2 offers a more determinate criterion than ACF1, it is similarly312
unable to draw the right distinctions concerning which speech acts can be lies. This is313
evident when we consider conjectures. By uttering (4), Luisa can intend to represent314
herself as believing its literal content (4*) (that the blood is Reza’s): if she believes that315
the blood is someone else’s, ACF2 incorrectly predicts that her conjecture is a lie. To316
be sure: I am not claiming that whoever says (4) will ipso facto represent themselves317
as believing (4*), which is blatantly incorrect. I am merely claiming that there can be318
circumstances in which a speaker utters (4) with the intention17 to represent themselves319
as believing that (4*), which is all that ACF2 requires.320
Furthermore, as for ACF1, the problem is not limited to conjectures: there are several321
speech acts (like guessing, supposing, hypothesising) that one can use to represent322
oneself as believing something (Searle 1976, p. 10), but not to lie. In sum, both ACF1323
and ACF2 fail to draw the right distinctions between explicit performatives that can324
and cannot be lies. If lying is to be defined in terms of an insincere assertion, we need325
to identify an alternative account that avoids their difficulties.326
3.3 Proposing to add to the official common ground327
Stokke’s (2013a, b, 2018) assertion-based definition is based on the accounts of328
assertion and conversational common ground developed by Stalnaker (1978, 2002).329
17 Note, further, that whether this intention is successful is irrelevant to whether ACF2 is satisfied.
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According to Stalnaker (2002, p. 716), “it is common ground that p in a conversation330
if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that p, and all believe that331
all accept that p, and all believe that all believe that all accept that p, etc.”. Assertion332
is understood by Stokke as a proposal to add a proposition (specifically, the content333
of the sentence one utters) to the ‘official’ common ground:334
(ACS) S proposes that p become part of the official common ground335
The notion of ‘official’ common ground is meant to exclude speech acts that are336
not assertions. Consider the following cases:337
(7) Pushkin’s beard never grew338
(8) Assume that (8*) I can lift weights with my mind […]339
(9) Let us suppose that (9*) there is a demon that systematically deceives us340
Although (8) and (9) are invitations to add a proposition ((8*) and (9*) respectively)341
to the common ground (what is accepted as true for the purpose of the conversa-342
tion), they are not assertions. The distinction between official and unofficial common343
grounds. Stokke (2013a, b, 2018) handles these cases effectively. Unofficial common344
grounds are ‘provisional’ common grounds that open up in order to store informa-345
tion that is used for some temporary conversational purpose; by contrast, official ones346
are, so to say, ‘permanent’ common grounds. ACS only captures proposals to add a347
proposition to the official, permanent common ground. This means that it correctly348
rules in assertions like (7) [since (7*) is meant to be stored in the official common349
ground] and correctly discards assumptions like (8) and suppositions like (9) [since350
(8*) and (9*) are stored in the unofficial, temporary common ground]. Although this351
distinction helps with assumptions and hypotheses, it seems unable to draw all the352
desired distinctions. Consider commands:353
(6) I command that (6*) you steal that chicken354
Here the distinction between official and unofficial common grounds is less helpful.355
It is not clear how the distinction applies to (6): without a systematic account of what356
qualifies as a contribution to the official common ground, the predictions of ACS in357
this sort of case are unclear. And if we attempt to extrapolate from ACS a criterion358
for dealing with these examples, it emerges that ACS struggles to make the required359
distinctions.360
There are various ways to extrapolate a criterion from ACS. For the purpose of361
this paper, I will limit my discussion to a criterion that is explicitly defended by362
Stokke in his book (2018) (I pursue a more thorough analysis in Marsili 2020b). Here363
he suggests that we can test whether a proposition has been added to the common364
ground (and therefore captured by ACS) by attending to whether it can be felicitously365
presupposed.18 To verify whether uttering (6) adds (6*) to the common ground, for366
instance, one needs to verify whether (6*) can be felicitously presupposed after the367
speaker has uttered (6). To test this, imagine a conversation between three individuals:368
18 A felicitous presupposition is one that does not elicit “the kinds of repair strategy that are typically
prompted by unfamiliar presuppositions”. Stokke (2018, p. 66), a identifies two repair strategies: accom-
modation (as defined by Lewis 1979), and ‘questions and rejections’—that is, (appropriate) replies of the
form: “What are you talking about?”; “What makes you think p?” or “I never said p”.
123
Journal: 11229 Article No.: 2933 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2020/11/30 Pages: 25 Layout: Small-Ex
A
u
th
o
r 
P
ro
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d
pr
oo
f
Synthese
Adriano, Beppe, and Carmen. Adriano orders Beppe to steal a chicken by uttering (6),369
and then Carmen utters (10), which presupposes (6*):370
(10) When you steal the chicken, you can use my cutters371
For ACS to pass the test, there must be no circumstances in which (6*) can be372
felicitously presupposed as a result of Adriano’s command, because the possibility of373
felicitous presupposition would indicate that (6*) can enter the common ground as374
a result of Adriano’s utterance. Clearly, such circumstances are possible: whenever375
Beppe and Carmen take Adriano to have the authority to command (6), it is possible for376
Carmen to presuppose (6*) (that Beppe will steal the chicken) felicitously via (10).19377
This is a problem for ACS, because it means that Stokke’s assertion-based definition378
counts (6) as a lie whenever Adriano successfully commands (6) and believes (6*) to be379
false. Perhaps there is a way to revise ACS so that it avoids these predictions. Absent380
major revisions, however, Stokke’s current proposal is unable to acknowledge that381
commands cannot be lies.20 For a definition that draws the right kinds of distinctions,382
it is better to look elsewhere.383
3.4 Warranting as true384
Carson (1988, 2006, 2010, followed by Saul 2012) takes a different approach: he385
defines a lie as an insincere statement that you intend to warrant as true. In other386
words, he adopts the following assertion-condition:387
ACC: S intends to warrant the truth of p388
Carson defines ‘warrant’ as follows: “if one warrants the truth of a statement, then389
one promises or guarantees, either explicitly or implicitly, that what one says is true”390
(2006, p. 294). According to this view, every time a speaker asserts something, they391
also implicitly promise that what they say is true.392
As I will argue in the next section, drawing the right distinctions between speech acts393
that can and cannot be considered lies requires adopting a view along these lines—one394
that links the act of asserting to the acceptance of a distinctive kind of responsibility.395
Nonetheless, ACS is known to be vulnerable to counterexamples, such as proviso-lies396
(Fallis 2009; Arico and Fallis 2013): lies in which the speaker makes it explicit that397
they are not promising that what they say is true. Here is a (slightly revised) example398
from Arico and Fallis (2013):399
19 To be sure, further conditions have to obtain for (6*) to be felicitously presupposed; for instance, it
should be common knowledge that stealing the chicken is physically possible. Listing them would lead us
astray, and is unnecessary. As long as it is possible for these further conditions to obtain, the point stands:
there are situations in which (6*) can be felicitously presupposed.
20 A referee points out that, since the embedded that-clause (6*) could be rewritten as an infinitive to-clause
(I command you to steal that chicken), it could be argued that (6) has no truth-evaluable content: “to steal
that chicken” is not truth-apt, and therefore cannot be believed to be false. If this is right, (6) is ruled out
by every definition. I offer a response to this sort of worries in Marsili (2020a). Simply put, as anticipated
in footnote 9, this manoeuvre would prove too much: also “I promise/swear/guarantee THAT ƒ” can be
translated into “I promise/swear/guarantee TO ƒ”, but we want to be able to count these utterances as lies.
Appealing to accounts à la Portner (2004), which differentiate between the speech acts that update the
common ground and those that update to-do-lists (cf. Roberts 2012), will not help for similar reasons: both
promises and commands, on this view, update to-do-lists rather than the common ground.
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Last night, after a particularly wild party, Chris found her swimming trophy400
broken. Today Chris is trying to figure out who broke her trophy. Chris says to401
Jamie, “So, somebody was in my room last night and broke my trophy. Did you402
see anything?”. Jamie clearly remembers that she was the one who broke Chris’s403
trophy. Since everyone knows that Mel is always breaking stuff, Jamie responds404
to Chris:405
(11) Yeah, um, Mel broke your trophy.406
(11’) But I was kinda drunk, and there were lots of people in there, so don’t407
take my word for it.408
In this example, Jamie’s statement (11) is followed by a ‘proviso’, (11’). The proviso409
is meant to rectify the previous statement, and to clarify that Jamie does not intend to410
warrant that (11) is true. As a result, Jamie does not warrant (11) as true, and Carson’s411
assertion-condition ACC is not met. Nevertheless, Jamie is clearly lying: this scenario412
is a counterexample to Carson’s definition of lying.413
Carson has since replied that, given that “warranting comes in degrees of strength, a414
moderately strong assurance of truth is all that is required for lying” (2010, pp. 36–39):415
the proviso (11’) reduces the assurance of truth that comes with (11), but does not416
eliminate it. If this is right, (11–11’) does satisfy ACC. However, the problem with417
this reply is that it is inconsistent with Carson’s account of warrant (Fallis 2013,418
pp. 347–348). Warrant is analysed as an implicit promise, and promises cannot be419
mitigated or downgraded. There is no sense in which they can give a “moderately420
strong” assurance of truth: either they guarantee that the speaker will do something,421
or they do not. To see this, consider the difference between adding a proviso to an422
assertion and adding a proviso to a promise:423
(12a) I will wake up at 7AM tomorrow, but you know that I am really unreliable in424
the morning, so don’t take my word for it425
(12b) # I promise that I will wake up at 7AM tomorrow, but you know that I am426
really unreliable in the morning, so don’t take my word for it427
While (12a) is a mitigated assertion, (12b) is not a mitigated promise: it is not a promise428
at all. More generally, it seems that promising that p requires an outright (as opposed429
to “moderately strong”) assurance that p is true.21 Pace to Carson, ACC fails to capture430
proviso-lies.431
These difficulties could be resolved by amending the notion of warrant in a way432
that avoids the parallel with promises. But it should be clarified from the outset that433
avoiding the parallel with promises would represent more than an amendment of ACC,434
because Carson’s original contribution to the literature resides precisely in having435
constructed an analogy between the breach of trust involved in unfulfilled promises436
and the one involved in lying (elaborating on Ross 1930; Fried 1978). Without such437
an analogy, ACC would no longer draw the moral parallelism that motivates Carson’s438
21 Here’s a more precise way to put the same point: the force of promises cannot be mitigated. Content-
mitigation (‘bushes’, in Caffi’s 1999 terminology), by contrast, is possible in promises: the content of “I
promise that [I will p]” can be mitigated into “I promise that [if q, I will p] and (for some but not all ps)
[I promise that I will p a little]; cf. Holton (2008). But the possibility of content-mitigation is irrelevant to
our discussion: proviso-lies are puzzling precisely because they involve the mitigation of the force of the
utterance, not its content.
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overarching philosophical project. In the next section, I will present an alternative way439
to formulate the assertion condition, which also links assertion to a distinctive kind of440
responsibility, while avoiding the problematic analogy with promises.22441
4 Assertoric commitment442
Before Carson, several authors have argued that asserting involves accepting some kind443
of responsibility for the truth of a proposition (Peirce CP 2.315, 5.29-31,543-547, MS444
280.25-26, 517.42-44, 36.104-5; Searle 1969, 1975; Brandom 1983, 1994; Searle and445
Vanderveken 1985; Green 1999, 2000, 2007, 2017; Alston 2000; MacFarlane 2003,446
2005, 2011, Rescorla 2009a, Krifka 2014; Tanesini 2016, 2019). I have elsewhere447
developed (Marsili 2020b) an account of assertion in terms of commitment that falls448
within this tradition. Simply put, my proposal is to define assertion in terms of the449
acquisition of this specific kind of commitment, and lying as an insincere assertion:450
Definition of Assertion451
A speaker S asserts that p iff:452
(a) S utters a sentence with content p453
(b) S thereby commits herself to p being the case454
Definition of Lying455
S lies iff S asserts that p insincerely456
Some preliminary qualifications are needed. The first is that all conditions are taken457
to be satisfied intentionally by the speaker. This is common in speech act theoretic458
analyses (Searle 1969; Alston 2000; but cf. Alston 2000, pp. 137–141), and it is459
especially uncontroversial for defining lying, as virtually every author agrees that460
there can be no such thing as unintentional lying.23 The second is that the notion of461
‘insincerity’ at play in the definition of lying is meant to be the one I advocated for in462
earlier work (Marsili 2014; 2018a, b, 2019): in standard cases,24 I take a speaker to be463
22 To be sure: accounts in terms of commitment like the one that I am about propose are in a very important
sense in agreement with Carson’s view. Crucially, they share the idea that lying requires the assumption
of a distinctive kind of responsibility. But it is equally important that they take a different stance on which
kind of responsibility is involved. Note, further, that it would be incorrect to regard commitment-based
proposals as mere refinements of Carson’s view: commitment-based analyses of assertion represent a rich,
independent tradition, whose roots go back Peirce’s writings, penned at the beginning of the XXth century,
about one century before Carson proposed his alternative view in terms of warrant and promises.
23 This requirement has the advantage of ruling out cases of misspeaking (Sorensen 2011) and may help
to deal with some other puzzling cases (cf. Pepp 2018). Note that if philosophers are wrong, and there can
be as unintentional lying, it does not follow that my definition is wrong: it just follows that some lies and
assertions fall out of my envisaged explanandum. For empirical and theoretical support for the claim that
unintentional lies are not lies, cf. discussion of the confused politician example in Carson (2006, p. 296)
and Arico and Fallis (2013).
24 By ‘non-standard’ cases I mean promises like (2), and more generally assertoric speech acts about
one’s future actions. In Marsili (2016) I argued (both theoretically and empirically) that a promisor can be
insincere (and lie) if she intends not to fulfil their promise, even if she believes that she will end up fulfilling
it against her will (for instance: S promises not to ƒ, intends to ƒ at all costs, but believes that she will
almost surely fail to ƒ). We need not dwell on these complications here, but the interested reader can find a
definition of insincerity that makes justice to both standard and non-standard cases in Marsili (2016, 2017,
pp. 148–151).
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insincere iff they take themselves to believe that what they are saying is more likely464
to be false than true.25465
Condition (b) does the lion’s share in the definition, and calls for some substantive466
elaboration. The notion of commitment is meant to capture the normative consequences467
of asserting something: it refers to a change in the speaker’s normative status that468
happens in virtue of the speaker’s act of asserting. While it has been pointed out in469
previous work that the notion of commitment could be helpfully put to work to define470
lying (Marsili 2014, pp. 165–170, 2018a, b, pp. 178–179; Leland 2015; Viebahn471
2019), I am aware of no attempts to provide a systematic proposal in this sense.472
Building on previous work on assertion, I will here attempt to provide a fine-grained473
characterisation of what assertoric commitment is, and then proceed to show how it474
can be put to work to draw the right distinctions about lying.475
I take assertoric commitment to involve two distinct normative dimensions. The476
first dimension is what I call ‘accountability’. In making an assertion, the speaker477
becomes reproachable if the proposition turns out to be false (a point also highlighted478
in Carson’s analysis). An early formulation of this idea is found in Pierce: “an act479
of assertion […] renders [the speaker] liable to the penalties of the social law (or, at480
any rate, those of the moral law) in case [the asserted proposition] should not be true,481
unless he has a definite and sufficient excuse” (CP 2.315). Alston (2000, p. 55) offers482
a more accurate definition of this distinctive kind of responsibility: a speaker accepts483
responsibility for p [being the case] iff the speaker “knowingly takes on the liability484
to (lay herself open to) blame (censure, reproach, being taken to task, being called485
to account), in case of not-p”.26 Arguably, accountability plays an important role in486
motivating communicators not to make false claims, ensuring that assertion maintains487
its role as a valuable tool for sharing and acquiring information (cf. Green 2007, 2009).488
In what follows, I will use the term ‘accountability’ to refer, more specifically, to489
the speaker’s prima facie27 liability to be criticised if what they said turns out to be490
false. To verify if a given speaker is accountable for the propositional content of a491
25 A final and perhaps less urgent qualification is that in this paper I will leave aside the issue of whether
(a) needs to be expanded. While the formulation that I adopt is quite standard, it rules out presuppositional
lies (Viebahn 2019) and non-literal lies (Viebahn 2017), and it may rule out non-declarative lies (Viebahn
et al. 2018), depending on how the notion of ‘content’ is construed. If one is moved by some (or all) the
examples presented by Viebahn, condition (a) can be expanded as required. For some further qualifications
about (a), see my footnote 1.
26 Alston reviews different accounts of taking responsibility for the truth of a proposition (in his terminology,
“R’ing”), eventually landing on a different view that, unlike the one quoted in the main text, entails that
it is only permissible to assert p if p is true (cf. Alston 2000, pp. 54–64). This requirement, also endorsed
by “truth-norms” of assertion (Weiner 2005; Whiting 2012) and, indirectly, by “knowledge-norms” of
assertion (Williamson 1996), is one that my notion of ‘accountability’ carefully avoids (for reasons discussed
in Marsili 2018a). Accountability, as I define it here, only has to do with downstream normativity (the
normative effects of asserting p), which is to be distinguished from (the related, but distinct notion of)
upstream normativity (whether you are entitled to assert that p—i.e. the kind of normativity invoked by
‘norms of assertion’). For more on the irreducibility of these notions to one another, cf. Rescorla (2009a)
and MacFarlane (2011).
27 The “prima facie” qualification is meant to specify that falsity only determines a defeasible right to
criticise the speaker. As noted by Peirce (see above), a speaker can be excusable for asserting something
false: for instance, if their false claim was uttered under coercion, or if they had excellent reasons to think
that what they said was true. But excusing someone for something implies that that person was responsible
for it in the first place. Prima facie accountability captures this broader notion of responsibility: that is, both
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given utterance, we need to ask ourselves: if that proposition turns out to be false,492
would the speaker be prima facie criticisable for the falsity of what they have said?493
However, the deontic effects of assertions are not exhausted by the speaker’s liability494
to sanctions. By making an assertion, a speaker also becomes committed to act in495
certain ways, if the relevant conditions arise. More specifically, asserting something496
commits the speaker to make certain conversational steps, such as making statements497
that do not contradict their previous ones, or justifying their claims with adequate498
evidence, when they are challenged to do so (cf. Brandom 1983, 1994, pp. 172–175,499
MacFarlane 2003, 2005b, pp. 227–229, 2011).500
Let us call this second normative component discursive responsibility, since it has501
to do with the conversational moves that a speaker is expected to make in the context of502
a rational discourse. Discursive responsibility has been modelled in different ways and503
within different theoretical frameworks (Toulmin 1958; Hamblin 1970a, b, chap. 8;504
Brandom 1983, 1994, pp. 172–175; MacFarlane 2003, 2005b, pp. 227–229, 2011).505
Within this literature, authors tend to agree that you are responsible to defend your506
claims (e.g. by providing evidence in their support) if appropriately challenged (or507
else take it back). To ‘challenge’ an assertion, in this sense, is to perform a speech act508
(typically a question28) that disputes the veracity of the speaker’s claim, such as ‘How509
do you know that?’, or ‘Is that true?”. In turn, a challenge to p is ‘appropriate’ only510
if it is not already a settled issue in the conversation that p is true.29 I will come back511
on these notions and distinctions in the next section, as I discuss some examples of512
conversational challenges.513
Since making an assertion inevitably involves undertaking both accountability and514
discursive responsibility, assertoric commitment is best characterised as the conjunc-515
tion of both normative effects. You are committed to a proposition if you are prima516
facie liable to be criticised in case the proposition is false, and prima facie expected517
to back up your claim in response to appropriate challenges (or else take it back). In518
sum:519
Assertoric commitment520
S is (assertorically) committed to p being the case iff521
(i) S is ‘accountable’ for p522
(ii) S is ‘discursively responsible’ for p.523
In light of this characterisation, the commitment-based definition of lying presented524
at the beginning of this chapter can now be expounded, to display more clearly which525
conditions need to be satisfied for a speech act to count as a lie:526
527
Footnote 27 continued
the cases in which the speaker is actually criticisable for saying something false, and the cases in which
such criticism would be warranted, if it hadn’t been defeated by extenuating circumstances.
28 Authors like Brandom adopt a narrower view: challenges can only be assertions that are incompatible
with what the speaker said (1994, p. 178, 238, Wanderer 2010). I take Brandom’s view to be unduly
restrictive (cf. Toulmin 1958; Rescher 1977, pp. 9–11; Rescorla 2009a), as it seems to me that questions
are a paradigmatic example of challenges to the veracity of someone else’s assertion.
29 Or, at least, if the speaker hasn’t already done all that she could to prove that p is true. In argumentation
theory there is considerable disagreement as to what makes a challenge legitimate, and it would be over-
ambitious for this paper to attempt to settle the issue once and for all; for further refinements, I defer to the
relevant literature (see e.g. Rescorla 2009b).
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Commitment-based Definition of Lying528
S lies iff529
(a) S utters a sentence with content p530
(b) In virtue of doing (a), S is accountable and discursively responsible for p531
(c) S’s utterance is insincere532
5 Drawing the right distinctions533
The commitment-based definition meets the desiderata that have been identified so534
far. First, it differentiates between lies and other statements whose content is believed535
to be false but that are not lies, such as ironic and metaphoric utterances. This is536
because ‘accountability’ clearly does not obtain in these cases: it would be patently537
inappropriate, for instance, to criticise an ironic or metaphoric utterance on the grounds538
that its literal content is false.539
Second, unlike Carson’s ACC, the proposed definition correctly identifies proviso-540
lies as genuine lies. While the notion of warrant cannot admit of degrees (because541
warranting is understood as an implicit promise), the notion of commitment can. The542
possibility of strengthening or diminishing the speaker’s degree of commitment to a543
proposition is widely acknowledged and discussed in the speech act theoretic literature544
(Searle 1976, p. 5; Holmes 1984; Searle and Vanderveken 1985, pp. 98–99; Coates545
1987, p. 112; Sbisà 2001, pp. 1805–1806; Simons 2007; Thaler 2012; Marsili 2014,546
pp. 165–170),30 and plays an important role in explaining the relations of ‘illocutionary547
entailment’ between different speech acts (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, pp. 130-548
131). For instance, most authors who employ the notion of commitment agree that by549
choosing to use the performative ‘swear’ in (13a) [instead of plainly asserting (13)] the550
speaker (call her Peppa) reinforces her commitment to the proposition (13*), whereas551
in choosing the performative ‘conjecture’ in (13b) she removes such commitment.552
(13) Emma was drunk last night553
(13a) I swear that (13*) [Emma was drunk last night]554
(13b) I conjecture that (13*) [Emma was drunk last night]555
Since swearing (as in 13a) involves a stronger commitment than asserting (as in 13),556
its utterance is said to ‘illocutionarily entail’ the performance of an assertion, meaning557
that it cannot be performed without also asserting that (13*) is true. By contrast, the558
speaker of (13b) is merely making a conjecture, which does not commit her to the559
truth of (13*): (13b) is not an assertion (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, pp. 129–130;560
cf. Marsili 2015, pp. 124–125, 2016, pp. 277–278).561
The test for discursive responsibility draws the right distinctions here. If we were562
to challenge (13b) with questions like “How do you know?” or “Is that true?”, Peppa563
would not be expected to provide evidence that (13*) is actually true. She could564
30 To be sure, there are many accounts of commitment on the market, and some authors (like Geurts 2019)
adopt a different, binary conception that does not admit of degrees. Clearly, this alternative conception will
not do for our purposes.
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appropriately reply: “I don’t know, I just made a conjecture”.31 Contrast this with565
Peppa’s sworn statement (13a): the same questions (“How do you know?”, etc.), when566
raised in response to (13a), would indeed generate an expectation that Peppa defend567
her claim (e.g. “I saw her stumbling around and slurring her words”). In this case,568
unlike with her conjecture, Peppa is discursively responsible for the truth of (13*).569
This shows that commitment can be reinforced (as in the sworn statement (13a))570
or removed (as in the conjecture (13b)), but not yet that it can be mitigated while571
still asserting, which is what we need to show in order to prove that the definition572
can capture proviso lies. Cases of this sort are not uncommon, and typically emerge573
from the use of some modifiers, such as evidentials or epistemic modals. For example,574
suppose Peppa says:575
(13c) Apparently (13*) Emma was drunk last night576
With (13c), Peppa undertakes responsibility for the truth of what she has577
said—although less responsibility than she would have undertaken, had she uttered578
the unguarded assertion (13*) instead (see e.g. Caffi 1999; Sbisà 2001, 2014). This is579
intuitive, but we can be more precise. In which sense is Peppa accepting ‘less responsi-580
bility’ in making the mitigated assertion (13c) in lieu of (13)? To answer this question,581
let us consider each component of commitment in turn.582
Accountability has to do with the social sanctions faced by the speaker if the propo-583
sition turns out to be false. Clearly, these sanctions can be more or less severe; the claim584
here is that mitigated assertions warrant less severe sanctions. This much is uncontro-585
versial: any competent speaker knows that, ceteris paribus, an unguarded statement586
like (13) warrants more severe criticisms than a guarded statement like (13c), if (13*)587
turns out to be false. In fact, it is often to diminish their liability to criticisms that588
speakers prefer using a mitigated assertion over an unguarded one (cf. Holmes 1984;589
Fraser 2010).590
A similar point applies to discursive responsibility. Speakers can be required to sub-591
stantiate their claims with adequate evidence, but mitigation devices can affect which592
kind (and amount) of evidence counts as adequate. Evidentials such as ‘apparently’593
can set the epistemic bar of adequacy to a lower standard of evidence (Sbisà 2014).594
In fact, it is natural to use a guarded assertion like (13c) instead more direct ones like595
(13) when one has some evidence in support of what they say, but not quite enough to596
license a direct assertion.597
This should clarify in which sense accountability and discursive responsibility are598
mitigated in (13c): (13c) licenses less severe sanctions than (13), and binds the speaker599
to a less demanding standard of evidence. The same is not true of the conjecture (13b),600
where neither condition is satisfied: it would be unfair to criticise Peppa for saying601
(13b) in case (13*) turns out to be false, or to demand her to provide evidence in602
support of the truth of her conjecture.603
31 At most, we may expect Peppa to explain why she made the conjecture, but this clearly falls short of
expecting her to provide evidence that (13) is true, which is what discursive responsibility requires. After
all, questions like “Why did you [performative verb] that p?” can be appropriately asked in response to
virtually any speech act. Their availability is irrelevant to determining whether the speaker is committed
(assertorically) to p: only the availability of challenges to the veracity of p reliably indicates that the speaker
is discursively responsible for p. For more on the appropriateness of challenges to assertions, conjectures,
and other assertive speech acts, see Green (2017, Sect. 2).
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Back to proviso-lies, the reason why they do not pose a threat to the commitment-604
based definition is that they behave like mitigated assertions (and unlike conjectures).605
In (11b) both accountability and discursive responsibility are met, although to a lesser606
extent:607
(11b) Mel broke your trophy. But I was kinda drunk, and there were lots of people608
in there, so don’t take my word for it609
By uttering (11b), Jamie signals that he is not willing to accept full responsibility for610
the proposition being true. Like the mitigated assertion (13c), and unlike the conjecture611
(13b), it is appropriate to inquire about the epistemic grounds for Jamie’s assertion612
(What evidence does he have to support the claim that Mel broke the trophy? Does613
he remember seeing him?). However, given the qualification added by Jaime, we will614
be satisfied with non-conclusive evidence in favour of the claim (e.g. he remembers615
seeing him, but cannot be sure). That said, the expectation that Jaime defend his616
claim is nonetheless clearly present: it would be inappropriate for Jaime to simply617
reply: “I don’t see why you’re asking these questions, I never claimed that Mel broke618
the trophy”. A reply of this kind would be appropriate, by contrast, if Jaime had619
simply made a conjecture, as in (13b). Similarly, it would be appropriate to reproach620
Jamie if the assertion turns out to be false (we may say: ‘You shouldn’t have accused621
Mel!’), although we would not be entitled to the same sort of reactive attitudes than622
an unguarded assertion would have warranted (after all, he admitted not to be sure).623
Like for (13c), both ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’ are mitigated,624
but satisfied. This shows that, unlike Carson’s ACC, the proposed definition counts625
proviso-lies as mitigated assertions (and therefore as lies).32626
Lastly, my proposal seems able to draw the right distinctions about explicit perfor-627
matives. Since betting and swearing were discussed above (13a, 13b), we only need628
to consider the following cases:629
(1) I assert that (1*) I received expressed consent from the patient630
(2) I promise that (2*) I will wear a blue dress at the wedding631
(5) I advise that (5*) you try that quich632
(6) I command that (6*) you steal that chicken633
(8) Assume that (8*) I can lift weights with my mind […]634
(9) Let us suppose that (9*) there is a demon that systematically deceives us635
The predictions of the commitment-based definitions are rather straightforward636
here. By asserting or promising that p in (1–2), the speaker becomes accountable and637
32 A referee points out that proviso-lies like (11) do not invite belief in their unmitigated content (Mel broke
your trophy), and asks whether this is compatible with generating a commitment towards that content. My
answer is positive. Simply put, the proviso at most prevents the realisation of a perlocutionary effect
(making the hearer believe that p), which is logically (and pragmatically) compatible with bringing about
the illocutionary one (committing yourself to p). Assertors typically intend to achieve the perlocutionary
goal of convincing the hearer (usually, we aim to convince our interlocutors), but they can make assertions
even if they do not have this intention (Davis 1999; Alston 2000; Green 2007; Sorensen 2007; MacFarlane
2011). If this is right, explicitly denying that you have a perlocutionary intention (“you don’t have to believe
me”, “don’t take my word for it") does not prevent you from bringing about your assertion’s illocutionary
effect (committing yourself to p). For a discussion of some other species of provisos that threaten my
view more directly, in particular in response to Rudy Hiller’s examples (2016, pp. 38–51), see my Marsili
(2020b).
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discursively responsibile for their content, namely (1*–2*), so that these utterances638
are counted as lies when they are uttered insincerely. On the other hand, by uttering639
(5), (6), (8) and (9) the speaker does not become committed to the corresponding640
propositions (5*), (6*), (8*) and (9*), so that these utterances cannot be classified641
as lies by the definition. For instance, in response to (8) it would be inappropriate to642
reproach the speaker if it turns out that she has not telekinetic powers, or to challenge643
the speaker by asking “How do you know that you have these powers?”. It is apparent644
that the same tests are passed by all the other explicit performatives that cannot be lies645
(namely (4), (6), and (9)).646
It could be objected that it is not clear that in promising (2) the speaker becomes647
assertorically committed to (2*), as I have claimed above. Promissory commitment648
and assertoric commitment differ in important respects: promising involves being649
responsible for making something true, while asserting involves being responsible650
for something being true (Watson 2004). Perhaps (2) commits the speaker to (2*)2 651
‘promissorily’, but not ‘assertorically’. The test for discursive responsibility seems to652
corroborate this hypothesis: asking “How do you know?” or “What makes you think653
that?” in response to (2) is simply inappropriate, and it does not seem that one would654
be expected to support their claim with evidence in response to this sort of challenges.655
Although I agree that there is more to promissory commitment than just assertoric656
commitment, this does not mean that the former is incompatible with the latter. Within657
the speech-act theoretic framework that I am adopting (Searle and Vanderveken 1985,658
p. 184), the relation between promissory and assertoric responsibility can be explained659
in terms of the notion of ‘illocutionary entailment’ introduced earlier. The underlying660
idea is that, if I promise that (2*) (“I will wear a blue dress at the wedding”), I am661
also thereby claiming that it will be true, at time of the wedding, that I will wear a662
blue dress: whenever promissory responsibilities arise, assertoric ones have to arise663
too.33 At closer inspection, this objection is rather based on a misunderstanding of664
what constitutes discursive responsibility in (2).665
Recall (Sect. 4) that discursive responsibility only requires the speaker to answer666
appropriate challenges (cf. MacFarlane 2005b). Challenges are not appropriate (in667
the relevant sense) if they are infelicitous for reasons that have obviously nothing to668
do with the force of the original utterance. A typical example is when a challenge is669
infelicitous because the answer is already common knowledge in the conversation.670
If I claim “My tooth hurts”, it would be inappropriate to challenge my claim by671
asking me “How do you know?”, because it is already obvious how I know that my672
tooth hurts—but this clearly should not be taken as evidence that my utterance is673
not an assertion. Similarly, since whether I wear a blue dress at the wedding will674
depend primarily on my decisions, asking “How do you know?” in response to (2)675
would not be an appropriate challenge. In both cases, the challenge is inappropriate,676
because it is obvious that the challenger already knows the answer to the question,677
so that considering its availability is irrelevant to determining whether the speaker is678
committed to the proposition.34679
33 I defend this claim in more detail in Marsili (2016, pp. 277–278).
34 Although these distinctions will do for our present purposes, a further clarification may be of interest, if
only to resolve apparent terminological inconsistencies. In Marsili (2018b) I consider these issues in more
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How should we test for discursive responsibility in these cases? Since in these680
contexts the speaker’s reasons for believing (2*) are already common ground, we681
should consider challenges that put into question the veracity of the utterance more682
directly: for example, “Does it really [hurt]?”, or “Will you really [bring a blue dress]?”.683
Just like ‘How do you know’ challenges, these questions are appropriate only when684
the speaker is assertorically committed to the relevant proposition, so that they still685
constitute a reliable test for discursive responsibility. And the latter questions are686
clearly available in response to (2), showing that also in this case the speaker is bound687
by the relevant discursive obligations. In addition to this, in (2) also ‘accountability’688
clearly obtains: if I eventually wear a red dress to the wedding, I can be criticised for689
(2*) being false, and appropriately so. The right verdict is thus given also in the case690
of insincere promises.691
It seems that the proposed account avoids all the counterexamples that affect other692
views. Unlike the other definitions considered so far, it deals correctly with a wide693
range of performative utterances, distinguishing speech acts that can be used to lie from694
speech acts that cannot. It captures not only standard assertions, but also assertions695
uttered by means of explicit performatives (e.g. ‘I hereby assert that p’) and explicit696
performatives that illocutionary entail an assertion, such as acts of promising or swear-697
ing. It is able to rule out illocutionary acts that are not assertions, including speech698
acts belonging to the class of assertives (like bets, conjectures, and suppositions), and699
directives (like commands, advice, and suppositions).700
The proposed definition brings together two philosophical traditions that analyse701
(respectively) assertion in terms of accountability and discursive responsibility, to702
deliver a fine-grained account of the distinctive responsibilities that emerge in virtue703
of asserting a given proposition, improving on previous attempts to characterise the704
distinctive responsibilities that all liars undertake. Due to its intensional accuracy, it 3705
provides a potentially insightful analysis of two concepts (assertion and lying) that706
are central to many contemporary philosophical inquiries in ethics, epistemology, and707
philosophy of language.708
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Footnote 34 continued
depth, and differentiate between a challenge being inappropriate (which depends on whether the answer to
the challenge is already in the common ground) and illegitimate (which depends on whether the speaker was
committed to p in the first place). Only when a challenge is ‘illegitimate’ we have evidence that the speaker
is not discursively responsible for p. Of course, challenges to promises like (2) are only ‘inappropriate’ in
this sense, whereas challenges to non-assertoric acts like (6) or (8) are genuinely ‘illegitimate’.
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